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Abstract. Today’s debates present ‘occasionalism’ as the position that any 
satisfying account of divine action must avoid. In this paper I  discuss how 
a leading Cartesian author of the end of the seventeenth century, Pierre-Sylvain 
Régis, attempted to avoid occasionalism. Régis’s case is illuminating because 
it stresses both the difficulties connected with the traditional alternatives to 
occasionalism (so-called ‘concurrentism’ and ‘mere-conservationism’) and also 
those aspects embedded in the occasionalist position that should be taken into 
due account. The paper focuses on Régis’s own account of secondary causation 
in order to show how the challenge of avoiding occasionalism can lead to the 
development of new accounts of divine action.
In solving problems it is not sufficient to make use of the 
general cause and to invoke what is called a Deus ex machina.
G. W. Leibniz, A New System of the Nature and 
Communication of Substances (1695)
I. DIVINE ACTION AND OCCASIONALISM: 
CONTEMPORARY WORRIES AND HISTORICAL CASES
Contemporary theologians, philosophers of religion and philosophers 
of science widely debate (and largely disagree) about what could be the 
best account of divine action. Nevertheless, they seem to have reached 
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a consensus about what such an account should not be. The majority of 
the authors engaged in this debate refer to ‘occasionalism’ as the position 
that any satisfying account of divine action must avoid.1 ‘Occasionalism’ 
is generally understood as the claim according to which God is not only 
constantly operating in the created world, but he is also the only cause 
causally efficacious, while finite creatures (‘secondary causes’ in the 
scholastic jargon) do not exercise any causal role.2
Occasionalism has a long history. During the medieval period, it was 
defended mainly among Islamic theologians. Authors such as Al-Ghazali 
were interested in demonstrating the inconsistency of the Aristotelian 
‘pagan’ philosophy defended by Avicenna and Averroes. Among the 
arguments delivered against Aristotelianism, Islamic theologians argued 
extensively that finite creatures cannot have any causal efficacy on their 
own, by contending that God is the only cause constantly operating in 
nature. Yet, occasionalism never gained consensus among medieval 
Christian scholastics. The occasionalist position was discussed and 
rejected by all the main scholastic authors, from Aquinas to Suárez, and 
only a  few medieval thinkers explicitly embraced it.3 Things suddenly 
changed in the second half of the seventeenth century. Not only did several 
of Descartes’s disciples (Geulincx, La Forge, Cordemoy, Malebranche) 
explicitly brand occasionalism as the true output of Cartesianism, but 
all the most influential authors of the period (Locke, Boyle, Leibniz, 
Clarke, Bayle, Hume) considered occasionalism an  option deserving 
serious consideration. Recognizing that ‘occasionalism’ has a history is 
important to avoid the risk of oversimplifications and misrepresentations 
in today’s discussions.
In this paper I would like to focus on the case study offered by one of 
the most prominent Cartesian authorities of the end of the seventeenth 
century, Pierre-Sylvain Régis (1632-1707), in order to analyze how he 
attempted to resist the occasionalist position despite his endorsement 
of Descartes’s philosophy. Régis’s case is particularly interesting because 
it illuminates the insufficiency of other major scholastic attempts to 
resist occasionalism and presents an original new account of secondary 
1 See Murphy 1995 and 2009, Saunders 2002, Clyton 2004, Tracy 2009, Russell 2009, 
Silva 2011.
2 For an overview of the occasionalist position see Freedoso 1994.
3 Perler and Rudolph 2000 provides the best discussion of medieval occasionalism. 
Yet, besides Islamic occasionalist only Pierre d’Ailly (1350-1420) and Gabriel Biel (1415-
1495) are the main representatives of medieval occasionalism.
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causation. The contemporary reader might wonder why Régis’s case 
is relevant to today’s discussions since our contemporary conceptual 
landscape and account of the physical world seems incommensurate with 
that of a seventeenth-century Cartesian author. I have two responses to 
this concern.
My first answer is conceptual. In this paper I  will concentrate my 
attention on the metaphysical argument defended by Régis, which is 
based on a reflection on the nature of God’s immutability. At this level 
of metaphysical abstraction Régis’s position should not be seen as 
incommensurate with today’s discussions in theology and philosophy 
of religion since the concern for granting God’s immutability is 
a metaphysical issue worth considering in itself.
My second answer is historical. Today’s discussions on divine action 
often rely on a  precise historical understanding of the seventeenth 
century ‘scientific revolution’,4 which is usually depicted as the beginning 
of the ongoing process of the secularization of science.5 However, one 
of the main issues that remains unexplored is precisely how the concept 
of divine action evolved and in what ways did debates on divine action 
contribute to the later development of the scientific revolution. From 
this point of view, by examining Régis’s position it will be possible to 
foster a more refined and less simplistic account of the interplay between 
metaphysical, theological and scientific concerns that shaped the debate 
on divine action across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
In section 2, I outline Régis’s argument against occasionalism and 
explain in which sense his account of secondary causation offers a new 
way to understand the relationship between divine action in nature and 
the causal efficacy of creatures. In section 3, I explain that the novelty 
of Régis’s account is reflected in the early reception of his view and the 
criticism that it offers nothing but a form of occasionalism in disguise. 
Nonetheless, I  also show that Régis’s position is less idiosyncratic of 
what it might appear at first sight. To support this claim I offer evidence 
that his account of secondary causes is consistent, for instance, with 
some crucial points already defended by Spinoza for reasons analogous 
to that presented by Régis. In section 4, I offer a few conclusive remarks 
on the way in which this discussion can be useful for today’s debates on 
divine action.
4 E.g. Dodds 2012.
5 E.g. Israel 2011.
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II. RÉGIS’S ACCOUNT OF SECONDARY CAUSES 
AND HIS REJECTION OF OCCASIONALISM
Occasionalism is the result of two independent theses held together: 
(1) God acts immediately in nature, that is, he is immediately involved 
in the production of natural effects; and (2) secondary causes or finite 
beings do not have any causal power whatsoever. There are different ways 
to establish occasionalism. An  a  priori or theological way  – defended 
mostly by Islamic theologians and seventeenth-century authors such as 
Malebranche – consists in showing that the first thesis entails the second. 
For instance, God’s omnipotence entails that secondary causation is 
redundant. An a posteriori way – defended by Cartesian authors such 
as Geulincx and La Forge6 – consists in showing that the second thesis 
entails the first. For instance, since finite creatures cannot be causally 
efficacious (because, for different reasons that might be advanced, they 
fail to fully account for the production of phenomena that we observe), 
God must be constantly acting in nature in order to produce the events 
we experience.
From Aquinas to Suárez, a majoritarian alternative to occasionalism 
has been the so-called ‘concurrentism’. Concurrentism holds the first 
thesis but rejects the second. Aquinas, for instance, agrees that God must 
be immediately involved in the operation of natural beings, although 
he aims to establish that this does not rule out secondary causation 
but leaves room for creatures to contribute to causal processes.7 The 
burden of concurrentism is to show how the cooperation between 
God and creatures can be presented in a  consistent and convincing 
way. Concerning this problem, scholastics and later scholastics largely 
disagreed and offered a variety of different accounts that shall not concern 
us for our present purposes.8 However, it is important to note that a way 
6 Aquinas refers to these kinds of arguments indirectly in De Potentia, III.7: ‘according 
to Rabbi Moses some of the sages in the Moorish books of law asserted that all these 
natural forms are accidents, and since an  accident cannot pass from one subject to 
another, they deemed it impossible for a natural agent by its form to produce in any way 
a similar form in another subject, and consequently they said that fire does not heat but 
God creates heat in that which is made hot.’ Concerning La Forge see Sangiacomo 2014.
7 The main texts in which Aquinas defends this view are: De Potentia, III.7; Summa 
Theologiae, I q. 105 a. 5; Summa Contra Gentiles, III chs. 66-67; Scriptum Super Sententiis, 
II, dist. I, q. 1 a. 4. For an account of Aquinas’s view on secondary causation, see Silva 
2014. I will not discuss the consequences of Aquinas’s position for human will and its 
freedom, on which see Dvořák 2013.
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to avoid the difficulties raised by concurrentism is to reject both the 
thesis at the basis of the occasionalist position by holding that God does 
not act immediately in nature, but only mediately through secondary 
causes. Medieval opponents of Aquinas, such as John of Peter Olivi (ca. 
1248–1298) and Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (ca. 1275-1332/4), were 
among the first defenders of this position, which is usually labelled ‘mere 
conservationism’, although I prefer to call it ‘mediationism’.9 The majority 
of later scholastic authors, who were afraid of weakening the ontological 
dependence of creatures on God’s power, regarded mediationism with 
great suspicion.10
Régis’s position does not match with any of the above-mentioned 
views.11 Régis rejects the first thesis of occasionalism by arguing that God 
cannot act immediately in nature. From this point of view, he agrees with 
mediationists and disagrees with both concurrentists and occasionalists. 
However, Régis also endorsed a qualified version of the second thesis held 
by occasionalists by arguing that secondary causes are not per se causes. 
This means that secondary causes do not have an intrinsic causal power, 
but they operate as instruments of God, able to bring about their effects 
only because the power they use is numerically the same as that of God 
himself. From this point of view, Régis’s position is irreconcilable with 
that of both concurrentists and mediationists. Given this eccentricity of 
Régis’s view, I will label it ‘instrumental mediationism’. In the rest of this 
section I present Régis’s reasons for defending such a position.
Régis’s ontology admits three kinds of entities. The first is God, 
who is an absolutely perfect substance (i.e. a  thing existing in itself or 
‘en elle-même’),12 first cause and the creator of everything. The second 
includes two imperfect and dependent substances, namely, body and 
mind (esprit).13 The bodily substance is really distinct from the thinking 
8 For a historical outline of the different positions and their evolution see Schmutz 
2001.
9 Concerning Olivi see Frost 2014; concerning Durandus see Schmaltz 2008: 19-24.
10 See e.g., Suárez DM 22.1.1-23.
11 In discussing Régis’s position, I will refer to his two main works: Cours entier de 
philosophie, ou Systeme general selon les principes  de  M.  Descartes, published in 1691 
(hereafter Cours), and L’Usage de la rasion et de la foy published in 1704 (hereafter Usage). 
All translations are mine. For present purposes, the differences that sometimes occur 
between these two works do not concern us. For an overview of Régis’s position and its 
relevance in the early modern discussion, see Schmaltz 2002.
12 See Cours, pp. 72-73.
13 See Cours, pp. 80-81.
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substance and they are both completely general when conceived as 
substances; however, they can be modified in various ways. When the 
body and mind are modified in a  certain way, they are expressed as 
‘modal entities’ (‘estres modaux’), which defines the third kind of entity 
admitted by Régis’s ontology. Properly speaking, finite bodies and human 
souls (âmes) are not substances but ‘modal entities’, that is, ways in which 
the bodily or thinking substances are modified.
With this general picture in mind we can better appreciate how Régis 
explains the relation between God’s activity and finite things:
When I  reflect on the specific way in which modal entities act, I  see 
that they have no efficacy on their own. Thus, to stress this difference 
between the effects that God and modal entities bring about, I will call 
God ‘primary efficient cause’, and the modal entities ‘secondary efficient 
causes’. By ‘primary efficient cause’ I understand that cause that acts by 
itself and through itself, while by ‘secondary efficient cause’ I understand 
that cause that acts in virtue of another. Since secondary causes act 
more immediately than the primary cause, to stress this difference I will 
attribute the production of all the modal entities to the secondary causes 
rather than to the first cause. (Cours, pp. 109-110)14
Two major aspects of Régis’s account must be stressed since both 
represent crucial departures from concurrentism. First, God does not 
act directly on modal entities. Régis eagerly repeats that ‘when I reflect 
on the fact that since God is immutable he can act only through a very 
simple act of will; I see that the succession that is observed among modal 
entities cannot derive immediately from God; thus, it must derive from 
secondary efficient causes’ (Cours, p. 110).15 In other words, because the 
effects produced by modal entities imply change and succession, these 
14 ‘Quand je fais reflexion sur la maniere particuliere dont les estres modaux agissent, 
je conçois qu’ils n’ont rien d’eux-mêmes qui soit efficace ; c’est pourquoy, pour marquer 
cette difference par rapport aux effets que Dieu et les estres modaux produisent ensemble, 
je veux appeler Dieu, Cause efficiente premiere, et nommer les Estres modaux, Causes 
efficients secondes, entendant par cause efficient premiere, celle qui agit d’elle-même et par 
elle-même, et par cause efficient seconde, celle qui agit par la vertu d’une autre. Et parce 
que les causes efficientes secondes agissent plus immediatement que la premiere, pour 
marquer encore cette difference, j’attribueray la production de tous les estres modaux, 
non à la cause premiere, mais aux causes secondes.’
15 ‘Lors que je fais reflexion que Dieu estant immutable ne peut agir que par une 
volonté tres-simple; je vois bien que la succession qui se rencontre dans les choses 
modales ne peut venir immediatement de luy, et que par consequent elle doit proceder 
des causes efficientes secondes.’
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effects cannot follow from God immediately (since he is immutable and 
simple) but must be determined by other modal entities.
The emphasis on the fact that God does not act immediately in the 
operations of modal entities is crucial to Régis’s attack on occasionalism:
I say ‘secondary efficient causes’ rather than ‘occasional causes’ because 
occasional causes are incompatible with the idea of God. In fact, if by 
‘occasional causes’ I  understand those causes that determine God to 
produce some effect that he would not produce otherwise (unless these 
causes would offer him the occasion by themselves and without that he 
predetermined them), this would suppose in God a kind of indeterminacy 
that is incompatible with his immutability. Yet, if by ‘occasional causes’ 
I understand those causes that determine God’s will, which is by itself 
general, this would entail the same problem. Thus, I shall not say that 
secondary causes are occasional causes. (Cours, p. 110)16
According to Régis, occasionalism presupposes that God is not determined 
by himself to produce certain particular effects. From this point of view, 
occasional causes are incompatible with God’s immutability since they 
determine God to produce something that he would not have produced 
without the occasional cause acting upon him. Moreover, the occasional 
cause is defined as acting upon God directly in order to determine him 
to bring about immediately the effect that the occasional cause by itself 
has no power to produce.17 This entails that occasional causes make 
God immediately responsible for the production of finite and specific 
effects, which are once again incompatible with divine immutability 
and simplicity. Régis rules out occasionalism as such by precluding any 
possible immediate involvement of God in the causal process.
Nonetheless, Régis is adamant in admitting that secondary causes 
do not have any intrinsic causal power and can act only because God’s 
primary causation enables them to act in a  certain way. To explain 
16 ‘Je dis des causes efficientes secondes, et non pas des causes efficientes occasionelles, 
parce que les causes occasionelles paroissent répugnantes à l’idée de Dieu  ; car si par 
causes occasionelles, j’entends des causes qui déterminent Dieu à produire quelque effet 
qu’il ne produiroit pas, si ces causes ne luy en donnoient occasion d’elle-memes, et sans 
qu’il les ait prevenues, cela suppose en Dieu une indetermination qui est incompatible 
avec son immutabilité ; et si j’entends des causes qui determinent la volonté de Dieu qui 
est d’elle-meme generale, cela suppose encore le meme défaut. Je ne diray donc point que 
les causes secondes sont des causes occasionelles.’
17 The insistence upon the fact that occasional causes determine God to bring about 
effect was stressed by occasionalists such as La Forge 1997: 148.
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this point, Régis introduces a  further comparison between occasional 
causes and instrumental causes in order to claim that only the secondary 
efficient causes work as instrumental causes:
To reject this opinion [i.e. occasionalism], it is enough to show the 
difference between an  occasional cause and an  instrumental cause. 
The difference is this: we call occasional cause that which determines 
a  free agent to act, but which does not contribute in anything to the 
agent’s action. On the contrary, we call instrumental cause that which is 
determined to act by a principal cause, but in such a way that it modifies 
the action of the principal cause. [...] This being said, it will be easy to 
show that all secondary causes are instrumental causes in relationship to 
the first cause. (Usage, ch. 36, p. 205)18
While Aquinas and his followers maintain that secondary causes are 
per se causes, Régis argues instead that secondary causes have no active 
power ‘d’eux-mêmes’. Because God cannot act directly by producing 
changes in modal entities, he has to use secondary causes as his own 
instruments. However, Régis does not accommodate instrumental 
causality with intrinsic powers of finite things, as it happened in the 
concurrentist tradition.19 Rather, he equates secondary causes with 
‘instrumental’ causes in the sense that they do not have any causal power 
at all beyond the way in which God makes use of them.
To better explain this point, let us assume that a cause A produces the 
effect E. We can express this relation in the simplest way by saying that
A => E
On the one hand, a  concurrentist (e.g. Aquinas) would modify this 
expression in order to integrate God’s immediate and direct concursus, 
by stating:
18 ‘Pour refuter cette opinion, il suffit de faire voir quelle est la difference qui se trouve 
entre la cause occasionnelle et la cause instrumentale. Or elle consiste cette difference, en 
ce qu’on appelle cause occasionnelle celle qui détermine un agent libre ŕ agir, mais qui ne 
contribue rien ŕ son action ; et on appelle au contraire cause instrumentale, celle qui est 
déterminée ŕ agir par une cause principale, mais de telle sorte qu’elle modifie elle-męme 
l’action de cette cause principale. [...] Or cela posé, il sera aisé de faire voir que toutes les 
causes secondes sont des causes instrumentales à l’égard de la cause premiere.’
19 Aquinas’s account of instrumental causes is analogous to that of secondary causes: 
instrumental causes remain per se causes, although their causal power is exploited by 
a  superior agent to produce effects that the instrumental cause would not be able to 
produce by itself. On this point see Albertson 1954. Suárez will defend Aquinas’s view 
in DM 17.2.12.
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A (+God) => E
An occasionalist, on the other hand, would stress the fact that A can be 
only an explanatory cause, or rather it provides the occasion for God to 
produce E. In this sense, she would say that
A => (God produces) E
However, Régis’s solution differs from both these formulations. It could 
be expressed by saying that
God (A) => E
First, Régis differs from both concurrentists and occasionalists insofar 
as he rules out God’s immediate intervention. God does not act 
immediately to produce any effect whatsoever but he acts only through 
secondary causes. For instance, God does not immediately move a body, 
say B, but the motive force (i.e. God’s will) applied to another body, 
say A, determines B to move in a certain way (according to the law of 
motion) when A collides with B. Régis’s point is that, although without 
God’s power neither A nor B could produce any effect, once God has 
bestowed his power (i.e. the motive force), A is the more proximate cause 
that determines B’s motion on the basis of the physical properties of both 
A and B.20
Second, Régis denies (pace occasionalists) that bodies have only 
an explanatory role. In fact, bodies can play an explanatory role because 
they are immediately involved in the causal process.21 Finite bodies 
channel God’s general power by specifying its efficacy in order to bring 
about finite effects that could not be directly derived from God’s infinite 
and immutable power. Third, Régis also denies (pace concurrentists) 
that bodies are endowed with intrinsic causal powers. Rather, they can 
operate only because God applies his will to them. Modal entities are 
‘instrumental’ or ‘secondary’ causes in the sense that they can operate 
only because God allows them to operate.22
Régis’s fundamental reason for denying the immediacy of God’s 
action in nature is an appeal to God’s immutability. Since God is eternal, 
20 See Cours, pp. 303-306.
21 See Usage, ch. 36, p. 205.
22 From this point of view, I disagree with Ott 2008, and 2009: 112-130, who argued 
that Régis would have simply melded Aquinas’s concurrentisms with seventeenth century 
mechanist physics.
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it is inconceivable that mutable and changeable effects follow immediately 
from his own nature. Régis’s reason to deny that secondary causes are per 
se causes is that since they fully depend on God in order to exist and 
to be conserved in existence, it would be absurd to claim that they can 
have causal powers on their own. This does not mean that secondary 
causes are causally inefficacious – as occasionalists contend – but rather 
that they ‘channel’ God’s own power by modifying it in order to produce 
specific effects.
III. RÉGIS’S RECEPTION AND HIS DEBT TO SPINOZA
Not only did Régis never present himself as a concurrentist in Aquinas’s 
sense, but his contemporaries never perceived him in this way either. The 
first reaction to Régis’s position came from Jean Du Hamel (ca. 1633-
1714), a  scholastic professor of the Collège du Plessis, who published 
his Reflexions Critiques sur le systeme cartesien de la philosophie de M. 
Regis in 1692. Du Hamel attacks the claim that secondary causes cannot 
produce any true action. According to Du Hamel, God’s immediate 
involvement in the causal process is completely compatible with the 
fact that secondary causes are per se causes.23 From this point of view, 
De Hamel objects to Régis’s perspective that the standard concurrentist 
view is better placed to reject occasionalism. Régis’s answer is apparently 
puzzling for a  concurrentist such as Du Hamel since Régis wants 
to maintain that secondary causes do have a  power of acting (pace 
occasionalist), but this power is not essentially embedded in their own 
nature, being rather God’s own power infused in the secondary causes 
themselves.24 From this point of view, Régis refrains from joining the 
standard concurrentist position.
This is the reason why Régis’s solution was often received, rather 
ironically, as a form of occasionalism in disguise. In 1694, Henri de Lelevel 
published his polemical pamphlet La vray et la fausse metaphysique ou 
l’on refute les sentiments de M. Regis. Concerning the issue of secondary 
causation, Lelevel claims that Régis’s secondary causes are nothing but 
occasional causes.25 He points out that Régis’s account of secondary 
causation faces a dilemma: either we can perceive that secondary causes 
23 See Du Hamel 1692: 149-150.
24 In the case of human will, see the reply in Régis 1692: 85.
25 See Lelevel 1694: 121-122.
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are endowed with a real power of acting or we cannot.26 The first case 
would lead to concurrentism, and it would be the only way to preserve 
a real causal efficacy for secondary causes. Yet, we know that Régis rejects 
it. If God’s power is not really distinguished from the power of secondary 
causes, how can we claim that secondary causes have any power at all? 
If God participates in the production of a  certain effect, why is God’s 
omnipotence insufficient to bring about that effect? Lelevel recognizes 
that Régis comes to agree more with his occasionalist opponents than 
with his plausible Thomist allies. As a result, Lelevel concludes that Régis’s 
account of secondary causes is doomed to collapse in occasionalism.
Jacob Gousset stressed this point even more forcefully. In his 
Causarum Primae et Secundarum realis operatio rationibus confirmatur 
(published in 1716), Gousset reproduces Lelevel’s charge by arguing that 
Régis was actually an occasionalist and that his system was at odds with 
concurrentism as properly understood. Gousset believes that scholastic 
concurrentism is the only true remedy against occasionalism (Gousset 
1716: 112). He acknowledges that Régis expressly attempted to argue 
against La Forge and Malebranche – the two major occasionalists whom 
Gousset discusses in his book. However, according to Gousset, Régis’s 
argument against occasionalism is purely rhetorical.27 According to 
Gousset, Régis’s ‘secondary causes’ are nothing but causae sine quibus 
non – typically invoked by occasionalists.28 While an efficient cause is 
directly responsible for the production of a certain effect, a causa sine qua 
non is merely a condition (an occasion) for such a production. Therefore, 
a causa sine qua non cannot have any causal power on its own and must 
not be confused with an efficient cause.29 Régis’s secondary causes are 
causae sine quibus non (i.e. occasional causes) in disguise.
Gousset also expresses his scepticism about Régis’s analogy between 
secondary and instrumental causes.30 In fact, Gousset stresses that 
instrumental causes discussed by concurrentists are really endowed with 
active powers that will be then exploited and applied by the principal 
cause in order to bring about effects that the instrument alone could not 
26 See Lelevel 1694: 125-126.
27 See Gousset 1716: 64.
28 See Gousset 1716: 22.
29 Gabriel Biel and Pierre d’Ailly were the main scholastic supporters of occasional 
causes intended as causae sine quibus non, both mentioned by Gousset 1716: 124-128. 
Concerning Biel, see Perler and Rudolph 2000: 189-201.
30 See Gousset 1716: 65.
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produce. On the contrary, Régis’s understanding of instrumental causality 
denies any causal efficacy per se to instrumental causes by admitting that 
they can operate only because God bestows his own power on them.
This quick overview of the reception of Régis’s account of ‘instrumental 
mediationism’ among his contemporaries provides evidence that Régis’s 
effort to find a new alternative to both occasionalism and concurrentism 
appeared disorienting and problematic since its very reception. Yet, was 
Régis’s position really so idiosyncratic in the early modern period? We 
can better understand the status and degree of novelty of Régis’s account 
of secondary causation by verifying what could have been a  plausible 
early modern source for it.
Descartes is not a  promising candidate. Descartes’s followers 
interpreted him alternatively as the father of occasionalism (e.g. La Forge, 
Cordemoy, Malebranche) and as a classic concurrentist (e.g. Gousset). 
Today scholars also disagree on whether Descartes was an occasionalist 
(e.g. Garber 1992: 299-305), a concurrentist (e.g. Platt 2011), or a mere 
conservationist (e.g. Schmaltz 2008: 125-128). Be that as it may, Régis 
argues expressly against occasionalism. Moreover, he differs significantly 
from concurrentism because he denies that finite things are endowed 
with active powers. A fortiori, then, he could have neither been a mere 
conservationist. Hence, irrespective of how we decide to collocate 
Descartes’s position, it seems safe to assume that Régis’s own account 
of secondary causation is not deduced ‘according to the principles of M. 
Descartes’.
Nor does Dom Robert Desgabets, who inspired several of Régis’s 
claims, seem to be a feasible source of his account of secondary causation. 
Desgabets claimed that ‘it is the contact among bodies that determines 
God to move those that were at rest’.31 The fact that a body determines 
God is exactly the kind of occasionalist claim that Régis wants to 
contrast. Moreover, Desgabets expressly argues that bodies do not have 
any force on their own and thus that all secondary causes should be 
dismissed.32 Desgabets’s dismissal of secondary causes seems to support 
occasionalism rather than contrast it.33
31 Desgabets 1983-1985, III, p. 88.
32 Desgabets 1983-1985, III, pp. 88-89.
33 Schmaltz (2002: 256) agrees that ‘Regis was more consistent than Desgabets in his 
rejection of an occasionalism in Lelevel and Malebranche that relates creatures directly 
to God’.
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A  more likely candidate to explain Régis’s position is Descartes’s 
most heterodox disciple, namely, Baruch Spinoza. In the Usage, Régis 
takes care to refute Spinoza’s metaphysics.34 Nonetheless, the refutation 
demonstrates two important aspects of Régis’s attitude toward Spinoza. 
First, Régis knew very well Spinoza’s Opera Posthuma and was well 
acquainted with the Ethics. Second, Régis’s confutation of Spinoza 
concerns the claim that God is the only substance and each finite 
thing is just God’s modification.35 Actually, no one in the seventeenth 
century would have openly endorsed this claim. However, Régis admits 
that Spinoza’s principles might be helpful to some extent.36 In fact, 
Spinoza’s metaphysics provides remarkable support for Régis’s account 
of secondary causation.
First, Spinoza is deeply committed to the fact that God does not 
produce immediately any finite effect. Spinoza demonstrates that from 
God’s infinite nature only infinite effects can follow (E1p21)37. However, 
every finite thing must have been determined to act by God (E1p26).38 
Therefore, God must have determined every finite thing to act and 
operate only through other finite things (E1p28).39 The resemblance of 
34 Usage, pp. 481-500. Concerning the historical background of Régis’s refutation, see 
Vernière 1954, vol. 1, pp. 250-257.
35 Henri de Boulanviller effectively summarized the general strategy of Régis’s 
refutation by pointing out that ‘la plus grande partie de ces difficultés ne consiste que 
dans une distinction de substance en général et de substance en particulier, ce qui le met 
hors de la question dont il s’agit, puisque Spinosa n’admet point de substance particulière’ 
(Boulanviller 1973: 233. Boulanviller never published his manuscript of Examen de la 
Réfutation faite par M. Régis de l’Opinion de Spinosa sur l’Existence et la Nature de Dieu, 
which is actually not dated).
36 E.g. Usage, p. 499: ‘[ils] servent au moins, quand ils sont pris dans un bon sens, 
à confirmer ce que nous avons dit de la nature et de l’existence de Dieu.’ Régis is here 
referring to his account of God conceived as ‘une Pensée parfaite’ (ibid.).
37 ‘All the things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes 
have always had to exist and be infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and 
infinite.’ All quotes from the Ethics are from Spinoza 1994, quotes from other works are 
from Spinoza 2002.
38 ‘A  thing which has been determined to produce an  effect has necessarily been 
determined in this way by God; and one which has not been determined by God cannot 
determine itself to produce an effect.’
39 Cf. E1p28dem: ‘Whatever has been determined to exist and produce an effect has 
been so determined by God (by P26 and P24C). But what is finite and has a determinate 
existence could not have been produced by the absolute nature of an attribute of God [...]. 
It had, therefore, to follow from, or be determined to exist and produce an effect by God 
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Spinoza’s argument to Régis’s denial of God’s immediate action is crystal 
clear.40
Second, because finite things are nothing but modifications, they have 
no power to act for themselves. Finite modes completely depend on God’s 
activity to bring about their effects. In the Ethics, however, Spinoza does 
not deny finite activity. Rather, he derives finite activity from the fact that 
things are a modification of God and God’s essence is nothing but his 
power to act (E1p34). Hence, ‘singular things are modes by which God’s 
attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way (by 1p25c), that 
is (by 1p34), things that express, in a certain and determinate way, God’s 
power, by which God is and acts’ (E3p6dem). Again, Spinoza claims that 
‘modal entities’ do have causal powers. However, the causal efficacy of 
finite modes does not imply that they are causes ‘d’eux-mêmes’, but rather 
that God himself acts through them.41
Of course, Spinoza takes God as the substance to which finite modes 
inhere. Substance monism is crucial to fully understanding the meaning 
that these two claims have in the Ethics. Nonetheless, both claims do 
not conceptually depend on substance monism. God does not produce 
immediately any finite effect because finite effects cannot follow from 
an infinite cause. This claim does not depend on the thesis that God is 
the only substance, but rather on the ontological heterogeneity between 
infinite and finite effects. Furthermore, Spinoza denies that modes could 
be per se causes because modes do not exist per se but they inhere in 
a substance. Again, this claim does not depend on assuming that God 
is the only substance, but rather on the ontological difference between 
substance (existing in se) and modes (existing in alio). Spinoza’s 
Metaphysical Thoughts (CM), published in 1663 as an appendix to the 
Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, provide evidence to the fact that 
or an attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has 
a determinate existence.’
40 Cf. E1p28s: ‘since certain things had to be produced by God immediately, namely, 
those which follow necessarily from his absolute nature, and others [...] had to be 
produced by the mediation of these first things, it follows: I. That God is absolutely the 
proximate cause of the things produced immediately by him [...]. II. That God cannot 
properly be called the remote cause of singular things, except perhaps so that we may 
distinguish them from those things that he has produced immediately, or rather, that 
follow from his absolute nature.’
41 Spinoza often presents finite things as the passive material in God’s active hands, as 
clay in the potter’s hands (chomer beyad hayotzer) – a biblical metaphor Spinoza employs 
on several occasions (e.g., TTP, note 34).
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these two points can be conceptually separated from substance monism. 
Metaphysical Thoughts is presented as a ‘Cartesian’ discussion and does 
not include any claim for substance monism.
In the CM, Spinoza suggests that God does not create immediately 
modifications of substances.42 Spinoza defines creation as ‘an operation in 
which no causes concur beyond the efficient cause; or that a created thing 
is that which presupposes nothing except God for its existence’ (CM2, 
10, p. 203). However, he expressly remarks that ‘from this definition it 
clearly follows that there is no creation of accidents and modes. For these 
presuppose a created substance besides God’ (CM2, 10, p. 204). Indeed, 
‘created is every thing whose essence is clearly conceived without any 
existence, and which is nevertheless conceived through itself: for 
example matter’ (CM2, 10, p. 204). God directly creates and constantly 
conserves only substances and not their modifications. Only a substance is 
‘conceived through itself ’ while a mode is conceived through something 
else. This does not deny that modes, such as particular bodies, depend on 
God’s power to produce whatever effect they produce. Should God stop 
to conserve their substances, modes would completely cease to exist. 
Nonetheless, God’s creation and conservation implies only an ‘indirect’ 
concursus with finite modes. Spinoza himself recognizes that this view 
is quite far from that of Aquinas and other scholastics, ‘who, accepting 
God’s concurrence, interpret it in a sense quite at variance with what we 
have expounded’ (CM2, 11, p. 207).
In the Metaphysical Thoughts Spinoza also argues that finite things 
have no other power than that provided by God’s continuous concursus. 
According to Spinoza, finite things do have a ‘striving’ or ‘conatus’ to self-
preservation, which suggests a power to produce certain effects. On the 
one hand, Spinoza argues against the ‘distinction between the conatus 
of a thing and the thing itself ’ (CM1, 6, p. 188), that is, he suggests that 
the conatus ought not to be distinguished from the thing itself.43 If finite 
things have such a  conatus, they must be endowed with some causal 
efficacy. On the other hand, however, he claims that the ‘force [through 
42 Spinoza’s correspondent, Willem van Blijenbergh, attributes this claim to him (cf. 
Letter 18, in Spinoza 2002: 806). However, in his replies, Spinoza only maintains that 
God (necessarily) creates and conserves the essence of each thing (see, e.g., Letter 23, 
in Spinoza 2002: 832), from which (necessarily) follows every effect that the thing can 
produce.
43 Spinoza’s argument seems here very similar to what Descartes puts forward in 
Principles, II, art. 43.
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which things persevere in their own being] is different from the things 
themselves’ (CM2, 6, p. 197). Finite self-preservation is only made 
possible and constantly supported by God’s continuous creation. Finite 
things receive their power to act from God only, and this power does 
not exist in them beyond God’s activity. As Spinoza writes, ‘no created 
thing affects anything by its own force, just as no created thing began to 
exist by its own force’ (CM1, 3, p. 184). More explicitly, he claims: ‘we 
have demonstrated that things never have any power from themselves 
to affect anything or to determine themselves to any action’ (CM2, 11, p. 
207).44 Finite things do have causal powers, but these powers consist of 
nothing beyond God’s own power.
I  am not committed here to discussing whether these claims are 
coherent or fully consistent. The only point that I would like to stress is 
that the comparison between the Ethics and the Metaphysical Thoughts 
reveals that Spinoza constantly holds the two claims at stake: 1) God does 
not act directly in producing finite modes; and 2) finite things have no 
causal power of their own. Spinoza holds these two claims irrespective 
of his endorsement of substance monism. Both these claims are much in 
the vein of what Régis wanted to argue. The interesting point, of course, 
is not whether Régis was a  full-blown Spinozist. Rather, the reference 
to Spinoza is worth noting because it confirms that in order to contrast 
the assaults of occasionalism, Régis did not simply resuscitate medieval 
concurrentism but preferred to defend a position already espoused by 
Spinoza. Arguably, Régis’s account of secondary causation seemed so 
controversial to his contemporaries because it was difficult to encapsulate 
it in the three major scholastic accounts of God’s concurrence.
44 In the Metaphysical Thoughts, Spinoza follows Descartes (and the scholastic 
tradition) in equating creation and conservation. In his Cours, Régis distinguishes the 
immediate creation of substances from the generation of modal entities. Nonetheless, 
he states that ‘la conservation des substances n’est que leur creation continuée’ (Cours, 
p. 101). In his Usage Régis argues instead that creation refers to substances only while 
conservation refers to modal beings, and he rejects the scholastic equation between 
conservation and creation (Usage, pp.  158-166). Régis is led to this position by his 
need to defend the doctrine of the ‘indefectibility of substances’ that he inherited from 
Desgabets (see Schmaltz 2002: 94-113), which plays a much more prominent role in the 
Usage rather than in the Cours. For present purposes, however, this change only indicates 
that Régis is willing to weaken even that kind of immediate involvement of God’s activity 
in finite beings that was represented by his continuous creation.
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IV. REJECTING OCCASIONALISM: NOT SO EASY
The discussion of Régis’s position offers evidence of the fact that rejecting 
occasionalism is by no means a simple enterprise. The exact meaning of 
the occasionalist claim that God is the only cause in nature depends on 
the specific arguments used to support it. Resorting to occasionalism as 
an ultima ratio solution for the problem of causal interactions among 
bodies is very different from defending occasionalism on the basis of 
strong a priori theological concerns regarding God’s omnipotence. Even 
assuming that we should not embrace the occasionalist position, a mere 
denial of it does not entail any positive account of secondary causation 
in particular.
Régis’s case illustrates some of the main problems that affect the two 
traditional alternatives to occasionalism developed in scholastic and 
later scholastic thought. Although concurrentism can be developed in 
a variety of ways, the very reason for embracing it is the possibility of 
maintaining the thesis that God acts immediately in nature, although 
without undermining the causal efficacy of secondary causes. However, 
this claim seems to conflict with God’s immutability and infinity. 
Concurrentists try to avoid this problem by maintaining that God 
always operates uniformly in nature and that secondary causes actually 
modify and determine through their own causal powers God’s general 
power. However, as Duns Scotus already noted (Ordinatio, IV, dist. 1, 
q. 4) against Aquinas, it is far from obvious that it would be possible to 
distinguish in a given effect a part of it immediately arising from God 
and another part immediately arising from the secondary cause. For 
instance, although Thomists could claim that God bestows a general esse 
on his creatures and then they modify it in specific ways, Scotus objected 
that in finite effects it is impossible to distinguish between this general 
esse and the determination arising from secondary causes. In fact, we 
do not experience general esse but always a  specifically modified and 
determined being. But if it is not possible to clearly separate between 
what depends immediately on God and what depends immediately 
on the secondary cause, it seems unclear why and how the claim that 
God concurs immediately with secondary causes can be maintained. 
Furthermore, following Spinoza’s argument, it seems impossible that 
finite effects could follow immediately from an infinite Being. From this 
point of view, Régis’s instrumental mediationism has the advantage of 
avoiding these metaphysical worries.
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However, Régis also acknowledges that there is a theological concern 
at the basis of occasionalism that should be taken seriously, which is 
about the ontological autonomy of secondary causes. Both concurrentists 
and traditional mediationists consider secondary causes as per se causes, 
that is, as intrinsically endowed with causal powers. Yet, since secondary 
causes completely depend on God for their existence and conservation 
in being, it seems difficult to conceive of how they could be endowed 
with causal powers per se, that is, with causal powers numerically 
different from God’s own power. Should God withdraw his constant 
act of creation and conservation, secondary causes would simply cease 
to exist and act. This is the reason why Régis (and in a more extreme 
way Spinoza) defended a non-substantivist account of finite things, by 
conceiving them not as substances but rather as modes (i.e. as entities that 
cannot be conceived of per se but must be referred to something else in 
order to exist and be conceived).
To conclude, the case of Régis illustrates that when today’s theologians 
and philosophers join their voices in the common admonition that 
a workable account of divine action should reject occasionalism, it must 
be carefully considered that such a rejection is neither easy nor univocal. 
Régis’s position exemplifies that the more common and established 
alternatives to occasionalism are not without their own difficulties, to 
which Régis’s ‘instrumental mediationism’ attempts to remedy. The take 
home message of this historical analysis is not that Régis’s account must 
be universally adopted or taken as the ultimate solution to the problem of 
finding an alternative to occasionalism. Rather, Régis’s case – with all the 
difficulties that it entails and that were perceived by his contemporaries – 
illustrates how the challenge of occasionalism forces us to critically 
evaluate past accounts of divine action and seek new solutions. This was 
true for Aquinas’s earlier effort to outline the concurrentist model and for 
several later authors who were engaged in developing different varieties 
of it. This was true for Durandus’s mediationism and for Régis’s view 
as well. From this point of view, occasionalism can be appreciated in 
today’s discussions if not as a viable position at least as a proper occasion 
to deepen the nature of divine action and its relationship with the causal 
power of finite creatures.
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